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Toby Dodge is a lecturer in the Department of Politics at Queen 
Mary University in London. His research concentrates on the 
evolution of the post colonial state in the Middle East, specifically 
Iraq.  
Dodge's research projects have looked at such topics as the shift 
from the colonial to the post colonial with the birth and evolution 
of the state in Iraq; the use of coercive diplomacy in the post 
cold war world; how the application of sanctions on Iraq 
transformed the state, society and the economy; the Bush 
doctrine, the reordering of international relations and 
intervention in "rogue" states; and the causes and consequences 
of regime change in Iraq.  
Dodge is author or editor of several books on Iraq, including 
Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a History 
Denied (Columbia University Press, 2005); Iraq's Future: The 
Aftermath of Regime Change (Routledge, 2005); Iraq 
Transformed: Violence, Poverty and War (Blackwell Publishers, 
2004);and Iraq at the Crossroads: State and Society in the 
Shadow of Regime Change (Oxford University Press, 2003).  
Iraq is the first autocratic and Muslim-majority country that the 
United States has attempted to democratize since Sept. 11. 
Regime change in Iraq was part of the broader U.S. project to 
plant democracy in the Middle East, albeit with force and from 
without, in hopes that this would eradicate terrorism and create 
an impetus for positive change in the broader region.  
Unfortunately, said Toby Dodge, lecturer in the Department of 
Politics at Queen Mary University in London, this project has 
clearly failed, both in its implementation and the realization of its 
goals. It is important to examine the political and social dynamics 
of post-Saddam Iraq for two reasons: first, to understand why 
this project failed, and second, to discern what should be done to 
keep post-invasion Iraq from continuing its downward spiral into 
chaos and division and help it evolve into a stable system with 
some semblance of democracy.  
Iraq is rife is with ethnic and sectarian divisions, Dodge said, 
although an overwhelming percentage of the population is 
Muslim. After the U.S.-led invasion, the country witnessed the 
destructive potential of such divisions as it emerged into a 
political arena free of any state control. For several reasons, Iraq 
faces enormous difficulties in creating a stable political system 
that can guarantee security and basic social services for its 
citizens. The legacy of the Baathist rule is important in this 
regard, along with two dynamics unleashed after the U.S.-led 
invasion: the rise of radical Islam, with a strong dose of 
nationalism, and sectarianism, which threatens to plunge the 
country into civil war.  
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 If Iraq continues to slide down the path of sectarian violence 
perpetrated by militias in absence of a central political authority, 
Dodge argued, the result will be not only increased radicalization 
of politics and possible break-up of the country, but also the 
destabilization of the broader Middle East. Therefore, it is very 
important to correctly identify the reasons for chaos and conflict 
in Iraq in order to keep it from getting worse. Only then may one 
talk about prospects of democratization anywhere else in the 
region.  
The decades-long Baathist rule in Iraq did much to shape Iraqi 
society, Dodge said. After Iraq was created by the British in 
1920s, the state was vulnerable both domestically and 
internationally. The Baath party countered this by solidifying its 
authority. With a powerful bureaucracy, the Baathists atomized 
society by either co-opting or eliminating powerful groups. They 
also made sure a huge portion of the Iraqis were dependent on 
state payments for economic survival. Through a massive 
nationalization program, the state became the largest landowner 
and oil producer, and it came to control all aspects of social 
security, health and education. Saddam also infused the country 
with a high dose of Iraqi nationalism that emphasized the 
centrality of the strong state.  
However, in the wake of United Nations sanctions in the 1990s, 
this large state apparatus was cut back extensively. Poverty rose 
among the Iraqis, and there was enormous inflation and 
malnutrition. Marginalizing the party, Saddam came to rely on 
patronage to maintain his power, using diffuse and informal 
channels of distribution. Iraq's complex bureaucracy was 
hollowed out with lack of resources and increasing corruption.  
This poverty and decline in state services led to two trends in 
Iraq. The first was the emergence of an extreme Iraqi 
nationalism that was stubborn and proud of survival. The second 
was the re-Islamification of the Iraqi society, with increasing 
piety among the masses. Re-politicized Islam began to fill the 
vacuum left by the declining state and to offer certainty in the 
face of hardship and instability. The Saddam regime was content 
with Islam's new role, as long as the anger of masses was 
directed at foreign powers. But with the demise of the regime, 
Dodge said, one unintended consequence of the U.S. invasion 
was to create ample political space for this radical Islam to 
flourish.  
U.S. military superiority was clear during the war; however, the 
U.S. army could not secure the country after Saddam was 
overthrown. The initial lawless celebration of Saddam's fall 
turned into looting and endless violence. After the fall of the 
Baathist regime, all aspects of the state were gone and 
bureaucracy vanished. Political mobilization in the complete 
absence of the state proved to be disastrous.  
Why did such extreme violence erupt in Iraq? First, Dodge said, 
with no authority to guard law and order in the aftermath of 
Saddam's fall, lawlessness became the norm. Second, a plethora 
of independent militias armed with sectarian ideologies forced 
themselves onto the scene, wielding the power to pursue their 
goals. The new Iraqi regime simply could not guarantee its own 
safety, let alone that of its citizens. Third, the presence of foreign 
troops gave rise to a vicious insurgency. As insurgents emerged 
in a localized fashion, U.S. forces were ill-equipped to deal with a 
decentralized enemy.  
Non-governmental organizations were not able to help restore 
order in Iraq because they had broken down during the years of 
Baathist rule and U.N. sanctions. Thus, Dodge said, there was no 
functioning civil society. As the regime vanished, the powerful 
ideologies of Islamism and nationalism that it had been keeping 
under control were unleashed. As Iraq descended into chaos and 
violence, with various political forces unable to form a united 
government, sectarianism became the defining factor in the new 
Iraq.  
Iraq is divided along sectarian and ethnic lines between Sunni 
Arabs, Shiite Arabs and Kurds, Dodge said. Within both sectarian 
communities, there are radical and moderate political groups that 
overtly employ Islam. Radical Shiite clerics such as Muktadar Al 
Sadr pose the greatest danger to the emergence of a stable, 
democratic Iraq for two reasons. First, they are fundamentalist in 
ideology. Second, they command a huge following through their 
religious standing and provision of basic social services. This is 
very important because the absence of state has led many 
ordinary Iraqis to seek refuge with powerful clerics who are able 
to provide security and means of survival.  
These clerics, in turn, pursue a two-pronged strategy. First, they 
project an uncompromising, radical image by leading rebellions 
and battling U.S. forces actively in the streets. But they also play 
an important political role by influencing the political process 
behind the scenes, having their followers run for office and 
sending the message that nothing can be accomplished without 
their support.  
Shiites see a real chance for ruling Iraq after the fall of Saddam, 
since they constitute the majority. Their highly religious message 
is heavily dominated by radical clerics. Sunnis, on the other 
hand, are alienated from the system because the Baathist party 
was their main channel of rule. They fear domination by the 
Shiites and so many have turned to radical measures to prevent 
this from happening. Therefore, Dodge argued, the actions of 
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both sectarian groups have not been conducive to establishing 
stability in Iraq.  
In the absence of a central authority, political mobilization is 
fraught with danger, as the current state of affairs in Iraq clearly 
shows. If the current Iraqi government fails, Dodge said, radical 
groups will capitalize on the alienation of Iraqis and engage in 
more violence to achieve their sectarian goals. In order to 
achieve stability in Iraq, state institutions with the power to rule 
the entire country must be built from the bottom up. This begins 
with the security forces, as nothing can be accomplished in the 
absence of basic safety.  
It is important to remember that the whether state is sustainable 
depends on how legitimate it is deemed by the population, Dodge 
said. Therefore, Iraq 's future depends on the ability of state 
institutions to become central to the Iraqi people's ongoing 
struggle for survival. The reconstruction of a viable Iraqi state 
must take place before anything else can be achieved. The state 
needs to monopolize the use of force within its territories and 
become central in the provision of public goods and services. 
Increasing the state's administrative capacity is a must to keep 
radical groups from filling the void and crushing any chance of 
constructing Iraqi citizenship, let alone achieving democracy.  
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